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TERRITORIAL WATERS-AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LICENSES FOR FISHING TUNA IN THE EASTERN
PACIFIC OCEAN-AN ATTEMPT AT UNIFORMITY IN AN AREA WHERE
CONFLICTING JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS HAVE CREATED TENSIONS AND
CONFLICTS
The Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement (Agree-
ment) was opened for signature on March 15, 1983;1 the United
States, Costa Rica and Panama were the first nations to sign it."
Upon ratification or adherence to the Agreement by five coastal
states, the Agreement will enter into force.3 This Agreement is the
latest step toward the resolution of a longstanding and bitter con-
flict arising from differing views on the extent of control which
coastal states can exercise over ocean resources.4 The Agreement
calls for cooperation among Pacific coastal states to ensure the
conservation and optimum utilization of tuna species in the area.'
To accomplish this, the Agreement creates an international body
which will issue regional licenses for fishing tuna in a broad area of
the eastern Pacific Ocean.' It is through issuing these licenses that
the parties to the Agreement hope to bridge the large gap between
'The Agreement was signed and deposited in San Jose, Costa Rica. Eastern Pacific
Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement, March 15, 1983, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in
S. TRATY Doc. No. 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Agreement).
' The United States Senate ratified the Agreement on July 27, 1983 by a unanimous vote
with no abstentions. 129 CONG. REc. S10,951 (daily ed. July 27, 1983). As of that date,
neither Costa Rica nor Panama had ratified it. Telephone interview with Dennis Weidner,
Foreign Affairs Officer of the National Marine Fisheries Service, United States Department
of Commerce (Aug. 30, 1983).
3 Guatemala and Honduras have recently signed but not yet ratified the Agreement. Tele-
phone interview with Dennis Weidner, supra note 2. The Agreement will enter into force
"thirty days after the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification or adherence by a
Coastal State." Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX.
4 Other attempts to resolve the conflict include: Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion, Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica for
the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T.
230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1950) [hereinafter cited as
IATTC]; The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 10, 1982, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.98/Rev.4, art. 64
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Law of the Sea Treaty].
8 The preamble to the Agreement states that the contracting parties have resolved to
cooperate "for the purpose of ensuring the conservation and rational utilization of tuna re-
sources in the eastern Pacific Ocean." Agreement, supra note 1, preamble.
6 The Agreement establishes an implementing council in which each contracting nation
has one representative and one vote. The main authority vested in the Council is to issue
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the conflicting jurisdictional claims. Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna
Fishing Agreement, March 15, 1983, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -,
reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. No. 3 (1983).
The dispute over tuna fishing rights is a consequence of conflict-
ing views on the extent of control which coastal states should exer-
cise over ocean resources. Canada, Mexico, and other coastal na-
tions claim exclusive jurisdiction over resources located within 200
miles of their coasts.8 The United States, on the other hand, ref-
uses to recognize coastal state regulation of the highly migratory
tuna in any area other than the traditional twelve mile territorial
sea.' This difference in views has caused a seemingly endless cycle
of seizures of United States tuna vessels by coastal nations with
exclusive 200 mile limits and subsequent embargoes against those
nations by the United States.'0
This conflict in the Pacific has existed for more than thirty
licenses to fish tuna in a broad area of the eastern Pacific. Agreement, supra note 1, art.
III(B).
7 Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement: Hearings on S. Treaty Doc. No. 3
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983)(statement of
August Felando, President, American Tunaboat Association) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
0 Mexico claimed an exclusive 200 mile zone in 1976; Canada made a similar claim in
1977. Moore, National Legislation for the Management of Fisheries Under Extended
Coastal State Jurisdiction, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 153, 178-80 (1980). Over 90 nations now
claim exclusive jurisdiction over all fishing activities in their 200 mile zones. 128 CONG. REc.
H839 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1982).
* Although the United States claims a 200 mile fishing zone, it refuses to assert the right
to control migratory fishing within that zone. The Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 (FCMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882, prohibits the United States from recognizing a
fishing zone claimed by aiiy country which "fails to recognize and accept that highly migra-
tory species are to be managed by applicable international fishery agreements, whether or
not such nation is a party to any agreement." Id. § 1822(e). The FCMA defines "highly
migratory species" as tuna only. Id. § 1802(14). For the definition of "highly migratory spe-
cies," see infra note 15. The FCMA defines "international fishery agreement" as a fishing
agreement, convention or treaty to which the United States is a party. 16 U.S.C. § 1803(15)
(1976). The term "conservation and management" is defined as all rules, regulations, and
other measures required to maintain or restore any fishery resource and assure that fishery
resources can be taken on a continuing basis with options available for future uses of these
resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1976). The exact duties of the regional or international
agency are not addressed by the FCMA, but the definition of management and conservation
is broad enough to include all those duties which are required to manage the fish stocks so
that their continued supply for a variety of uses is ensured. The definition, however, does
not require that fish stocks be managed so as to ensure maximum or optimal economic
returns.
"o Under the FCMA, if a foreign country seizes a United States tuna vessel based on a
claim of jurisdiction not recognized by the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury may
be required to impose an embargo upon the importation of all tuna products from that
country. 16 U.S.C. § 1825(a)(4) (1976). For the text of the provisions, see infra note 37.
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years.1 1 The first boat seizure occurred off the coast of Ecuador
when Ecuador claimed that a United States tuna boat had violated
its territorial waters.12 After reaching a peak in the mid-fifties,13
the number of incidents in the dispute lessened considerably until
the late 1970's when Canada and Mexico claimed exclusive juris-
diction over 200 mile zones.1" Their claims directly opposed the
United States refusal to recognize exclusive coastal state jurisdic-
tion over tuna except within a twelve mile limit. Thus, it is with
Canada and Mexico that the most recent conflicts have arisen.
While the United States has claimed a 200 mile fishing zone of
its own, it does not claim exclusive jurisdiction in the zone since it
does not control the fishing of "highly migratory species," which
means tuna, within this zone.15 Under the Fishery Conservation
" In 1945 President Truman, acting in response to fish depletion and food shortages
caused by World War II, declared that the United States could legally control areas adja-
cent to its coasts. The Truman Proclamation stated that the United States would exercise
jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of its contiguous continental shelf. Proc-
lamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945). Although no specific outer limit to the shelf
was given in the Proclamation, an accompanying legal memorandum suggested the 100-
fathom (600-foot) isobath as the maximum depth. See A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
Tm LAW OF THE SEA 49 (1981). The Proclamation was unilateral; no other country had ad-
vanced such a claim. It also specified that the superiacent waters, those waters beyond terri-
torial limits, would continue to have the status of high seas. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed.
Reg. 12,303 (1945). However, an accompanying Proclamation stated that within the high
seas areas contiguous to the United States coast the Government reserved the right to est-
ablish fishery conservation zones, should these prove necessary. Proclamation No. 2668, 10
Fed. Reg. 12,304 (1945).
The United States soon abandoned the Truman Proclamation; nevertheless, it unleashed
a flurry of new maritime claims by other nations. In October 1945 Mexico proclaimed juris-
diction over its continental shelf and established a fishery conservation zone of unclear lim-
its. The following year both Argentina and Panama claimed control of the resources of their
adjacent shelves and of the superjacent waters, and in 1947 Chile and Peru declared sover-
eignty over the resources of their contiguous waters to 200 miles from shore. In 1952 Peru,
Ecuador, and Chile joined in the Santiago Declaration which proclaimed their sovereignty
and jurisdiction to 200 miles from shore. The United States refused to recognize these ex-
tended zones. Krueger & Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 326 (1979).
" Hollick, The Roots of U.S. Fisheries Policy, 5 OCEAN D.v. & INT'L L. 61, 84 (1978).
18 In 1955 Ecuador seized 53 foreign fishing vessels, the greatest number of such seizures
during a single year. Carl, Latin American Laws Affecting Coastal Zones, 10 LAw. Am. 51,
56 (1978).
14 See supra note 8.
IS The United States established a 200 mile economic zone in 1976 but exempted tuna
from its jurisdiction on the ground that tuna is a highly migratory species. Although Annex
I of the Law of the Sea Treaty, supra note 4, lists 17 different categories of "highly migra-
tory species," including marlins, swordfish, sailfish, and sharks as well as eight types of tuna,
the United States restricts its definition of "highly migratory species" to "species of tuna
which in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in waters of
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and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA), the United States does not
claim domain over tuna within its 200 mile fishing zone; the basis
for the refusal to assert exclusive jurisdiction is that a country
should not be allowed to exercise control over such highly
migratory fish merely because they swim within 200 miles of its
coast. 6 The United States view is that since highly migratory spe-
cies are often available outside a coastal authority of even 200
miles, the questions of how much stock can be taken, where, and
by whom cannot be resolved by the unilateral actions of coastal
states.1 7 The United States contends, therefore, that such species
can be managed effectively only through international cooperation
and agreement."8
Canada, like Mexico and nearly all other nations except the
United States, insists that it can establish an exclusive economic
zone of 200 miles and claim jurisdiction over all resources found
therein.1 9 In 1977 Canada and the United States avoided the
problems arising from their conflicting views by agreeing to allow
reciprocal fishing in their respective 200 mile zones."0 Canada al-
lowed this agreement to expire a year later and immediately un-
dertook to enforce its exclusive 200 mile zone.2 1 The Canadian de-
cision to increase enforcement was prompted in part by difficulties
in bargaining with the United States. Prior to the seizures, United
the ocean." FCMA, supra note 9, § 1802(14).
16 FCMA, supra note 9. See G. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEA'S LIVING REsoURCES: LEGAL
AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 50 (1977).
17 Because of the tuna's highly migratory nature, developments in one portion of a stock's
range affect the stock throughout its entire range. Scientists have warned that all nations
participating in a region's fisheries must cooperate if conservation and optimum utiliziation
are to be achieved. One commentator has noted that "if coastal states alone were to be given
management authority for highly migratory species, they might well find themselves, as a
result of overfishing in mid ocean, exercising sovereign rights over 200 miles of empty
water." Joseph, The Management of Highly Migratory Species, MARINE POL'Y, Oct. 1977, at
275, 282. See also J. JOSEPH & G. GREEMOUGH, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF TUNA, POR-
POISE, AND BILLFISH (1979); S. SAILA & V. NORTON, TUNA: STATUS, TRENDS, AND ALTERNATIVE
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS (1974); G. KNIGHT, supra note 16.
" H.R. REP. No. 54, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 4 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 1669, 1671-72.
19 Ninety nations claim exclusive jurisdiction over all fishing activities in their 200 mile
zones. The United States is nearly the only country which continues to deny exclusive
coastal state jurisdiction over tuna. 128 CONG. REC. H839 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1982)(state-
ment of Rep. McCloskey).
20 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 68 (May 1979).
"1 Canada seized 19 United States tuna vessels in late August 1979. Canada claimed that
the vessels were fishing inside Canada's 200 mile zone. The tuna vessel captains were re-
leased after the United States Government paid their bail. L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1979, § IV,
at 11, col. 1.
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States vessels had expanded fishing for roe herring within the 200
mile conservation zone established by the United States in 1976.2
This expansion reduced the quantity of roe herring which ordina-
rily would migrate into Canadian waters.23 Canadian officials were
willing to allow United States vessels continued access to tuna
within Canadian waters if the United States had permitted
Canadian fishermen to harvest herring in the United States conser-
vation zone. 24 The United States, however, refused to accept this
bargain. 5 The United States Government apparently reasoned
that herring in the 200 mile zone were subject to exclusive United
States control because herring is not a "highly migratory spe-
cies."'26 Tuna, in contrast, are highly migratory; thus, the United
States did not recognize Canada's claims to regulate tuna within
the Canadian economic zone. Under this rationale, Canada did
not have a valid claim over tuna with which to bargain in the her-
ring controversy. Another factor prompting Canada's decision to
permit the lapse of the 1977 agreement was the acute shortage of
albacore, the most expensive grade of tuna, which is the primary
species for which the United States and Canada compete.2 8 Cana-
dian officials feared that United States fishermen would over-ex-
ploit the already diminished stocks of albacore if allowed to fish in
the Canadian 200 mile zone.2 '
Shortly thereafter, a similar conflict arose between the United
States and Mexico when Mexico also began to prohibit fishing by
foreign ships within its 200 mile zone.30 A multilateral arrangement
:2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1979, § I, at 33, col. 3.
3 Id.
24 Id.
i Telephone interview with Barbara Rothschild, Acting Chief of Office of International
Fisheries, United States Department of Commerce (Aug. 31, 1983).
= For the United States singular definition of "highly migratory species," see supra note
15.
Telephone interview with Barbara Rothschild, supra note 25.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FISHE SIE OF THE UNITED STATES 1979, at 2 (1980).
,This fear proved to be well founded as the stocks of albacore fell dramatically in 1980
and 1981. Canadian fishermen took in a 30% smaller catch in 1980 than 1979 and nearly a
40% smaller catch in 1981 than 1979. Telephone interview with Harold F. Cary, President
of the United States Tuna Foundation (Oct. 11, 1983).
"0 On July 3, 1980 Mexican officials warned United States fishermen that Mexico would
enforce its 200 mile limit after July 7, 1980. L.A. Times, July 4, 1980, § II, at 1, col. 1.
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution asserts exclusive control over the exploitation of all
resources within a 200 mile economic zone, including the harvesting of marine life. Max.
CONST. art. 27. The 1976 Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation amended Mexican law to
provide a new regime for the control of fishing by foreign ships. Law on Exclusive Economic
Zone, Diario Oficial [D.O.], Feb. 13, 1976.
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known as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC)8 ' has established since 1950 the total permissible catch of
certain tuna per year based on independent scientific data.8" Act-
ing as a quasi-advisory board, the IATTC's principal duties are to
study the tuna's biology and to suggest ways for member nations
to work together in maximizing the potential tuna catch.3 8 The
IATTC had diffused somewhat the tensions between the United
States and Mexico over tuna fishing for some years." In 1980, how-
ever, Mexican officials, upset with a deadlock in negotiations over
the portion of the regional catch to be allocated to the coastal na-
tions under the provisions of the IATTC, announced Mexico's in-
tent to enforce strictly its 200 mile limit after July 7, 1980."5 Days
later, Mexico began seizing United States tuna boats."' The United
States responded to these seizures by placing an embargo on all
'l IATTC, supra note 4.
"The IATTC provides the institutional framework for conservation measures in the Pa-
cific Ocean. Although initially the IATTC was signed only by the United States and Costa
Rica, it was subsequently adhered to by most of the major Pacific nations. While IATrC
members do not formally negotiate quotas, each year they have managed to establish con-
servation goals and to conduct the tuna fishery in a manner satisfactory to the members
through cooperative measures and informal agreements. Dyke & Keftel, Tuna Management
in the Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 3 U. HAWAn L.
Rzv. 1, 20-28 (1981).
"The Commission shall perform the following functions and duties:
1. Make investigations concerning the abundance, biology, biometry and ecology
of. . . tuna in the waters of the eastern Pacific Ocean ....
2. Collect and analyze information relating to ... fishes covered by this
Convention.
3. Study... information concerning methods and procedures for maintaining
and increasing the population of fishes....
5. Recommend ... proposals for joint action... designed to keep the popula-
tion of fishes... at those levels of abundance ....
IATTC, supra note 4, art. H.
J. JosmHs & G. GREEMOUGH, supra note 17, at 14.
" Mexico argued that because of its proximity to the tuna stocks it was entitled to larger
shares than it could take under a first-come, first-served approach and demanded that na-
tional quotas be established. The United States refused to recognize any special allocation
claims based on resources adjacency. Id. at 53. Mexico withdrew from the IATTC due to its
dissatisfaction with the situation. Id. at 54. In July 1980 Mexico decided to enforce strictly
its 200 mile zone. See supra note 30.
" On July 10, 1980 Mexican naval vessels seized a United States tuna boat fishing ap-
proximately thirty miles from the Mexican coast. Mexican authorities confiscated the catch,
valued at over $60,000, and the ship's nets, which were worth $150,000. Mexico also seized
two other United States fishing vessels that day. L.A. Times, July 11, 1980, § I, at 1, col. 2.
Subsequently, Mexico seized 14 United States vessels and fined the owners more than
$6,000,000. San Diego Union, Aug. 7, 1982, § B, at 3, col. 6.
1984] TERRITORIAL WATERS-LICENSES 241
Mexican tuna." Mexico then refused to negotiate seriously the
problem and further deepened the rift by announcing that it was
going to terminate the only remaining fishing agreement between
the two countries.3 8 That bilateral agreement had allowed small
United States vessels to fish within the 200 mile zone claimed by
Mexico and had allowed Mexican vessels to fish resources in
United States waters if such resources were determined to be in
surplus of the needs of United States fishermen."'
Similar disputes between the United States and various other
nations in Central and South America 0 prompted the United
87 Letter from Harold F. Cary, President of the United States Tuna Foundation, to John
Gavin, United States Ambassador to Mexico 3 (Aug. 5, 1983). This action was in accord with
the following:
(a) Determinations by Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State determines
that -
(4) any fishing vessel of the United States, while fishing in waters beyond any
foreign nation's territorial sea, to the extent that such sea is recognized by the
United States, is seized by any foreign nation...
(c) as a consequence of a claim of jurisdiction which is not recognized by the
United States; he shall certify such determination to the Secretary of the
Treasury.
(b) Prohibitions. Upon a receipt of any certification from the Secretary of State
under subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately take such
action as may be necessary and appropriate to prohibit the importation into the
United States -
(1) of all fish and fish products from the fishery involved, if any; and
(2) Upon recommendation of the Secretary of State, such other fish or fish
products, from the foreign nation concerned, which the Secretary of State finds to
be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.
FCMA, supra note 9, § 1825.
" On December 29, 1980 the Mexican Government formally notified the United States
that the Fisheries Agreement would be immediately terminated. 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 31
(March 1981). See Fisheries Agreement, Nov. 24, 1976, United States-Mexico, 29 U.S.T.
823, T.I.A.S. No. 8853.
80 The United States responded to the termination with resigned regret:
In expressing its regret over the Mexican decision and in voicing its willingness
to continue consultations toward a new framework for a positive fisheries relation-
ship, the United States must, nonetheless, express that it, too, has been disap-
pointed with the results of the relationship initiated in 1976 with such bright
hopes. For the United States, the fisheries relationship has been found not only
dissatisfying but frustrating.
81 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 31 (March 1981).
"0 In the last five years United States fishing vessels have been seized by Ecuador, Peru,
and Costa Rica as well as by Mexico and Canada. Costa Rica seized three United States
tuna vessels on January 18, 1979. Costa Rica claimed that the vessels were fishing 140 miles
off Punta Leona in Costa Rica's 200 mile zone. The United States Government paid the
fines, and the vessels were released. 93 U.S. JOINT PUMLICATIONS RuSEACH SEnvicz, TRANS-
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States to initiate talks about these issues with other nations in the
area."1 The objective of these talks was to set up an international
organization to secure optimum use of tuna resources both within
and beyond the 200 mile limits.42 The talks resulted in the drafting
of the Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement.4 The
Agreement is a positive step toward ending the dispute over tuna
fishing in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Whether the Agreement
achieves its purpose depends first upon its ability to resolve juris-
dictional disputes and second upon the willingness of the major
parties in such disputes to participate in the Agreement.
The Agreement, through its licensing arrangement, 44 seeks to
render moot divisive conflicts in the jurisdictional claims.'5 It pro-
vides for regional fishing licenses which allow tuna fishing within
the territorial waters of all participating nations.4'6 Thus, if effec-
tive, the pattern of licenses would diffuse the most divisive effects
of the conflicting jurisdictional views simply by sidestepping the
substantive issue, conflicting views on the territorial limit.47
The Agreement reflects the United States view that highly mi-
gratory species cannot be subject to regulation by the unilateral
LATIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 10 (1979). On February 16, 1979 the United States placed
an embargo on all tuna and tuna products imports from Costa Rica. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,171
(1979). During 1980 Costa Rica, Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru seized 22 United States tuna
vessels. The fines and other charges paid by United States fishermen totalled over $9.6 mil-
lion. 127 CONG. Rzc. S11,565 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1981).
"' Hearings, supra note 7, at 10 (statement of Theodore G. Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs).
42 Id.
43 See Agreement, supra note 1.
" Id. art. H.
" In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Kronmiiler
said that the Agreement "does not compromise the formal juridical positions of the parties.
It represents an equitable balance among the interests of Coastal States and distant-water
fishing nations." Hearings, supra note 7, at 8 (statement of Theodore G. Kronmiller, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs).
" Article IV of the Agreement establishes a system of international licenses to be admin-
istered by the Council. See supra note 6. The Agreement states that in order to fish tuna in
the area, "vessels... shall be required to have a valid license, issued in accordance with
this Agreement." Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV. The fee for the international license for
the first five coastal countries joining the Agreement is set at $60 per net registered ton of
the vessel to be licensed, but may be increased in increments up to a maximum of $100 per
ton as more nations become parties to the Agreement. The fees collected are to be distrib-
uted among the member nations in proportion to the annual amount of tuna taken within
200 miles of their coasts. Id. protocol.
47 Nowhere in the Agreement is a position or stand taken on the substantive question of
whether a nation can claim exclusive jurisdiction of the highly migratory tuna within a 200
mile exclusive economic zone. See Agreement, supra note 1.
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actions of the coastal nations.'" In so doing, it notes both that tuna
are highly migratory's and that any attempt at tuna conservation
in the area cannot be effective and equitable unless all nations
which fish tuna therein are participants.50 The latter point follows
closely the longstanding contention of the United States that such
highly migratory species can be managed effectively only through
international agreement. 1
The Agreement, by implication, also reflects the view of those
nations claiming exclusive jurisdiction in a 200 mile zone.5 2 It pro-
hibits any fishing within another nation's 200 mile zone unless the
vessel carries a license issued by the Council organized under the
Agreement.5" Therefore, if a vessel did not have such a license, a
nation could prohibit all fishing, including fishing for tuna, by that
vessel, thereby effectively claiming exclusive jurisdiction with re-
spect to the unlicensed vessel.
This licensing arrangement seems to be the only viable method
to overcome the sharply contrasting views on tuna policy. The ma-
jor states involved in the dispute have recently reiterated adher-
ence to their respective views;51 thus, it appears that any compro-
48 For the United States view, see supra note 9. For the basis of that view, see supra note
17.
49 "The Contracting Parties, recognizing ... the highly migratory character of the tuna
resource agree to continue their efforts to establish a new regional regime for the conserva-
tion, management, and orderly exploitation of tuna resources in the eastern Pacific Ocean."
Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIV.
50 The preamble to the Agreement states that "a tuna conservation regime for the eastern
Pacific Ocean cannot be effective and equitable unless it is comprehensive and has the par-
ticipation of all states that fish tuna in that region on a meaningful scale ... " Id.
preamble.
"' The necessity of participation by all nations which fish tuna also reflects the view of
the Law of the Sea Treaty, supra note 4, which recognizes the right of coastal nations to
establish 200 mile economic zones, but includes an exemption for migratory species such as
tuna. The Law of the Sea Treaty defers consideration of definite standards for international
regulation to later international agreement. Article 64 requires coastal nations and other
interested nations to cooperate in tuna regulation, either directly or through international
organizations, to secure optimum use of tuna resources. If no international organization ex-
ists in the area, article 64 requires the interested states to work toward establishing such a
body. Law of the Sea Treaty, supra note 4, art. 64.
" See supra notes 8 and 19.
" See supra note 46.
" On March 10, 1983 President Reagan stated that the policy of the United States con-
tinues to "neither recognize nor assert jurisdiction over highly migratory species ... includ-
ing tuna." Hearings, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Theodore G. Kronmiller, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs). Mexican officials answered by simply
stating that they "disagree" with this position. Letter from Harold F. Cary, President of the
United States Tuna Foundation, to John Gavin, United States Ambassador to Mexico,
supra note 37, at 3.
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mise on the substantive issue of territorial waters would be
impossible. Fortunately, the licensing arrangement makes such a
compromise unnecessary.
In order for the Agreement to succeed completely, however, the
participation of all states that fish tuna in the region is required. 5
The participation of the major fishing states in the area, the
United States, Mexico and Canada, is especially important if the
Agreement is to be more than merely a grand scheme with only a
patchwork of fishing zones under its jurisdiction.
Canadian participation in the Agreement, while very important,
is not urgent. Most tuna have fled cold Canadian waters for
warmer areas. 5 Recent Canadian seizures of United States vessels,
however, underscore the desirability of Canadian participation in
the Agreement. 57 There is also a longstanding series of disagree-
ments between Canada and the United States concerning both
fishing rights and territorial sovereignty over the continental
shelf.58 Because four such boundary disputes between the two na-
tions remain unresolved, Canada has tied participation in the
Agreement to a satisfactory resolution of these disputes.60
Whether Mexico will ratify the Agreement is uncertain at this
time.a1 Although the Agreement offers Mexico the attractive possi-
bility of having the United States lift its embargo on Mexican
" See supra note 50.
Only when the Canadian waters have been warmed due to seasonal temperature varia-
tions or ocean current movements are the tuna found in waters off the Canadian coast. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 16, 1979, § I, at 12, col. 1.
'7 See supra note 21.
" Canada and the United States still deny each other access to their 200 mile zones for
reciprocal fishing. The seabed boundaries are important not only because of fishing rights
but also because of growing interest in other seabed resources. A key problem area is the
Georges Bank region, located on the Atlantic Coast. The continental shelf in this area is a
promising source of oil and gas, and both nations consider the recovery of such resources in
the area an important step in reducing dependence on foreign oil. R. LOGAN, CANADA, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 2-3 (1978).
" The most highly disputed boundary involves the Georges Bank area. See supra note 58.
Three other disputes also remain unsettled: the Beaufort Sea on the Alaska-Yukon border;
the Dixon Entrance near the coast of British Columbia and Alaska; and the entrance to the
Strait of Juan de Fuca between Washington and Vancouver Island. The Beaufort Sea may
eventually yield oil and gas reserves, and both nations fish in the disputed waters of the
Dixon Entrance and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. R. LOGAN, supra note 58, at 57, 60-61.
" Telephone interview with Barbara Rothschild, supra note 25.
* While Mexico had not signed the Agreement as of January 1984, the country appears
willing to consider participation in the Agreement. On August 12, 1983, Mexico invited the
United States to a meeting where the two nations "might agree on the conditions which can
make possible the solution of this matter." Letter from Pedro Ojeda Paullada, Secretary of
Fisheries for Mexico, to John Gavin, United States Ambassador to Mexico (Aug. 12, 1983).
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tuna, Mexico would like to restrict the right to fish its territorial
waters to Mexican fishermen.62 Mexico's intransigence in this mat-
ter has been at the expense of that country's tuna industry. Unable
to export its tuna to any substantial foreign markets other than
the United States, many Mexican vessels have been forced to
reduce fishing operations.6 3 It is anticipated that many Latin
American countries in addition to Costa Rica and Panama soon
will join the Agreement, and diplomatic efforts are currently un-
derway to secure their signatures. " If a substantial number of
other nations join the Agreement, Mexico may be forced to enter
the Agreement or risk the possibility of a self-contained tuna
economy.e5
One possible weakness of the Agreement is its lack of any effec-
tive enforcement mechanism. On its face, the Agreement merely
asks the contracting nations to avoid prohibitions of tuna imports
from other contracting nations who take enforcement actions con-
sistent with the Agreement.66 However, there is no mention of the
penalties or consequences for a nation that does impose such an
embargo. The Agreement's requirement that each contracting na-
tion codify articles of compliance within its domestic law places
the enforcement of the Agreement squarely upon each individual
nation.67  This self-regulating compliance scheme has already
aroused the suspicion of many United States fishermen who feel
that Latin American countries have ignored regulations in past
agreements.68 It has been suggested that a multinational policing
62 Telephone interview with Dennis Weidner, supra note 2. There appears to be a politi-
cal split in Mexico concerning that country's participation in the Agreement. The Foreign
Ministry, cognizant of the complexities of international relations, favors Mexican participa-
tion. The Fisheries Ministry, however, is opposed to the Agreement because of concern
about preserving Mexico's 200 mile territorial limit. Telephone interview with Barbara
Rothschild, supra note 25.
" Mexico has been forced to drastically curtail plans to expand its tuna fleet as a result of
the United States embargo on the Mexican tuna industry. Weidner, The Latest Develope-
ments in Latin American Fisheries, DEP'T CoM. BULL., June 1983, at 2.
" Hearings, supra note 7, at 12 (statement of Theodore G. Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs).
Telephone interview with Barbara Rothschild, supra note 25.
" Article VI states that the members "agree not to prohibit the importation of tuna and
tuna products from another Contracting Party, as a result of any enforcement action by that
Contracting Party consistent with this Agreement as long as such Party is acting in con-
formity with this Agreement." Agreement, supra note 1, art. VI (a).
67 Id. art. VI (b). Article VI also provides that each contracting nation "shall adopt, as
soon as possible, such provisions in its national law as may be necessary to ensure that its
own flag vessels comply with the provisions of" the Agreement. Id.
" "[Tihe U.S. is the only country whose tuna catch is really regulated. We suspect that
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agency employing devices such as satellites and patrol boats is nec-
essary to ensure equitable enforcement of this type of agreement.69
Weaknesses in the enforcement provisions of the Agreement, how-
ever, will not necessarily render it ineffective. As long as the Agree-
ment conveys benefits to each of the participating nations, flexible
enforcement mechanisms will allow the Agreement to operate
smoothly.70
Contingent upon the participation of the major nations involved
in the dispute, notably Canada and Mexico, and upon the degree
to which the Agreement can be enforced, the Eastern Pacific
Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement could be an important step toward
the final resolution of the bitter conflict over the extent and char-
acter of territorial waters. 1
Gary L. Carter
most other countries are ignoring the present suggested yellowfin catch quotas." A Raid on
U.S. Tuna Rights, Bus. WEEK, May 14, 1979, at 59 (remarks of August Felando, general
manager of the American Tunaboat Association).
e See Fisher, Wood & Burge, Latin American Unilateral Declarations of 200-Mile Off-
shore Exclusive Fisheries: Toward Resolving the Problems of Access Faced by the U.S.
Tunafish Industry, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 643, 661-62 (1977).
" Mexico argues, however, that from its viewpoint the disadvantages outweigh the bene-
fits and that it is therefore hesitant to join the Agreement:
For Mexico the gains from the fishing of its resources by its nationals are
greater than in the case of fishing by foreigners, even if in such a case fees
equivalent to those agreed to in the interim Agreement are collected. Besides the
foregoing, one must take into account the important social benefits derived from
the capture by its nationals to supply the populace and export surpluses.
Letter from Pedro Ojeda Paullada, supra note 61.
" A primary concern permeating the Agreement is the creation of a long-term regional
tuna conservation regime. This Agreement, though merely interim, is a major step toward
such a regime. Agreement, supra note 1, preamble.
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